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RATIONALISM: THE MAIN PROBLEMS AND 
THEIR SIGNIFICANCE1 
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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I discuss the main characteristics of the epistemology of 
modal rationalism by proceeding from the critical investigation of Peacocke’s theory of 
modality. I build on arguments by Crispin Wright and Sonia Roca-Royes, which are 
generalised and supplemented by further analysis, in order to show that principle-based 
accounts have little prospects of succeeding in their task of providing an integrated 
account of the metaphysics and the epistemology of modality. I argue that it is unlikely 
that we will able to develop an exhaustive and accurate principle-based account that 
discriminates objectively between correct and deviant modal knowledge. Even if such 
an account can be formulated, a non-circular way of justifying its necessity also seems to 
be out of our reach. 
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1. Introduction 
The modal scepticism of early analytic philosophers is largely explainable by the 
traditional commitment of analytic philosophy to empiricist epistemology. 
According to the classical empiricist view about modality,2 there are two types of 
true propositions: those concerning knowledge of the ‘external world’ (what 
Hume calls ‘matters of fact’) and a priori truths (logical, mathematical, and 
semantic knowledge, what Hume would call ‘relations of ideas’).3 Necessity is the 
exclusive attribute of the latter type, precisely due to lack of factual content. The 
reliability of factual knowledge is ultimately grounded in a causal relation 
between our senses and the objects of experience, but any proposition that is 
causally grounded cannot be necessary, as no matter how many particular 
empirical inputs confirm it, there is no way one could ward off theoretically any 
                                                                
1 This paper is supported by the Sectoral Operational Programme Human Resources 
Development (SOP HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian 
Government under the contract number POSDRU/159/1.5/S/133675. 
2 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 18. 
3 Hume discusses only mathematical truths as cases of knowledge of ‘relations of ideas.’ The 
(Kantian) extension of the a priori to analytic and logical truths is, however, uncontroversial. 
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exception (as we do in mathematical proofs, for instance). The acknowledgement 
of necessary factual truth is therefore precluded by a traditional empiricist 
commitment. 
The famous case set forth by Kripke turned the tides in the analytic 
tradition in favour of the recognition of the existence of necessary a posteriori 
truths.4 What needs to be stressed here is that this reversal is more profound than 
a simple reconsideration of modal notions: one cannot accept that there are 
necessary factual truths and remain committed to classical empiricism, on pain of 
incoherence. One of the available alternatives is to endorse a rationalist viewpoint. 
Kripke and like-minded philosophers5 are rationalists concerning modal 
knowledge, that is, they hold that some modal knowledge is a priori and, 
moreover, that a posteriori modal knowledge is dependent on a priori modal 
knowledge. Also, rationalists hold that modal truth is mind-independent – more 
precisely, they uphold a substantive account of modal truth and maintain that 
modal knowledge latches onto mind-independent content. In fact, the central 
problem of modal epistemology – how do we have modal knowledge? – is truly 
meaningful (and pressing) in accounts that maintain that there is a distinct type of 
mind-independent modal knowledge; and rationalist theories are typical examples 
of this sort of account.6 There is no problem of modal knowledge for empiricist / 
naturalist sceptics concerning modality: knowledge of modal truths is typically 
reduced to knowledge of a priori truths. If the a priori is regarded as problematic, 
then so is the modal, but there is no special difficulty regarding modal knowledge 
beyond whatever problem the a priori leads to. Also, at the other end of the 
spectrum, there is no epistemological problem if modal knowledge is seen as no 
different from ordinary empirical knowledge (or if ordinary empirical knowledge 
is deemed to have a built-in modal component).7 Even if a slight difference of 
character between ordinary empirical knowledge and modal knowledge is 
                                                                
4 Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
5 See Stephen K. McLeod, “Rationalism and Modal Knowledge,” Crítica 41 (2009): 32 for a 
comprehensive list of doctrines regarding modality, including names of prominent modal 
rationalists. 
6 The need for an epistemological account also appears for those who hold that modal truth is 
literally reducible to truth in possible worlds, as in the case of Lewis’ theory of possible worlds 
in David K. Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). The lack of a causal 
relation with other worlds, which the possible-world theorist posits as truly existing, generates 
an analogue of Benacerraf’s dilemma for the case of modal realism. 
7 See Crawford Elder, “An Epistemological Defence of Realism About Necessity,” Philosophical 
Quarterly 42 (1992): 317-336; and Nenad Miščević, “Explanining Modal Intuition,” Acta 
Analytica 18 (2003): 5-41. 
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recognised, the troublesome character of modality can be explained away if our 
modality-grasping ability is considered an extension of a natural ability of human 
beings, namely, our ability to evaluate counterfactuals.8 
The central problem of modal epistemology arises accordingly only when 
the theorist regards ordinary truth and knowledge, on the one side, and modal 
truth and knowledge, on the other, as substantially different. The epistemological 
programme of modal rationalism is then correctly characterized as the attempt to 
bridge the gap between ordinary knowledge and modal knowledge by proceeding 
from the content of grounding a priori modal knowledge. In this paper, I attempt 
to formulate some sceptical concerns regarding rationalist attempts of 
transcending the properly acknowledged distance between ordinary truth and 
modal truth. I will not consider the details of all modal rationalist theories, but 
instead I will focus on one typical development of this doctrine, to wit, Peacocke’s 
moderate rationalism. I build on criticism of Peacocke’s theory by Wright and 
Roca-Royes and show that some of the critical insights of these authors, 
supplemented by other related concerns, can be extended to all forms of modal 
rationalism. But before exploring the significance of the mentioned criticisms, a 
brief exposition of Peacocke’s account of modality and its underlying purpose is 
required.9 
2. Peacocke’s Account of Metaphysical Modality 
Peacocke understands quite clearly the acute need of harmonising the metaphysics 
and the epistemology of modality and considers it a focal point of his endeavour. 
He calls the task of reconciling the account of the content of our true statements 
(metaphysics) with an account of how we are able to know that content 
(epistemology) the Integration Challenge.10 His Being Known is dedicated to 
developing accounts that meet ‘the Integration Challenge’ not only for necessity, 
but also for other important philosophical notions, such as freedom, self-
knowledge and intentional content, and the past. Peacocke maintains that the case 
of metaphysical necessity cannot be elucidated by means of a causal epistemology, 
                                                                
8 See Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007); Boris 
Kment, “Counterfactuals and Explanation,” Mind 115 (2006): 261-310; and Boris Kment, 
Modality and Explanatory Reasoning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) for theories based 
on this claim. 
9 The summarisation of Peacocke’s conception of modality follows Peacocke’s own brief account 
of his ideas in Christopher Peacocke, “Summary,” Philosophical Books 42 (2001): 81-83, and 
Roca-Royes’ exposition in Sonia Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts and the 
Integration Challenge,” Dialectica 64 (2010): 335-361. 
10 Christopher Peacocke, Being Known (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 1.  
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but rather by using a principle-based account, as modal truth is “fundamentally an 
a priori matter.”11 This is the basic content of Peacocke’s rationalist position 
concerning metaphysical modality: there are implicitly known a priori principles 
that determine the truth-value of modal statements. The truth of a priori 
statements is derived from the understanding conditions (and ensuing 
determination theories) of their constituent expressions.12 Peacocke’s declared goal 
is to provide a plausible intermediary way between Lewis’ modal realism and 
mind-dependent accounts.13 In this regard, he holds that there is a mind-
independent component to modal truth, but also that the metaphysical 
investigation of the modal domain should be akin to Strawson’s descriptive 
metaphysics, that is, it should proceed from the structure of our thought, in this 
case, of modal thought.14 
An assignment s has, in Peacocke’s account, the form of a quadruple <D, val, 
propval, ext>, composed of: the domain of objects D; the function val – the 
semantic value of concept C – which assigns an extension (object, truth-value, 
etc.) to C; the function propval – the property value of C – which assigns a 
property or a relation to (atomic concept) C; and ext – the extension – which 
assigns extensions to properties and relations. Every assignment has a 
corresponding specification (s-specification), which is the set of thoughts that the 
assignment counts as true. Then, 
A specification is a genuine possibility iff there is some admissible assignment 
which counts all its members as true.15 
That is, if a set of thoughts is to count as representing a real or genuine 
possibility, it must be true in an admissible assignment. Admissibility is defined at 
the level of assignments as compliance with all the Principles of Possibility – the 
implicitly known a priori principles that bear upon our modal knowledge. The 
Principles of Possibility are divided by Peacocke into three main categories. 
The first category includes only one principle, called the Modal Extension 
Principle (MEP), which can be stated in the following form: 
MEP: An assignment s is admissible only if: for any concept C, the semantic 
value of C according to s is the result of applying the same rule as is applied in 
the determination of the actual semantic value of C.16 
                                                                
11 Peacocke, “Summary,” 82. 
12 Peacocke, Being Known, 143. 
13 Cf. Peacocke, “Summary,” 82. 
14 Peacocke, Being Known, 2. 
15 Peacocke, Being Known, 126. 
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To take one of Peacocke’s examples, for the concept <bachelor>, an assignment 
will be admissible only if the semantic value that it assigns to this concept is 
obtained as the intersection of the extension of <man> according to s and the 
extension of <unmarried> according to s. While the extension of a concept may 
vary in different possible worlds (i.e. possible specifications, admissible 
assignments), the limits of its variation are fixed by the rules that determine its 
semantic value in the actual world. 
The Modal Extension Principle is complemented by a class of Constitutive 
Principles which function at the level of objects, properties and relations, whereas 
MEP works at the level of concepts and sense.17 The overall significance of 
Constitutive Principles is the following: an assignment counts as admissible 
(thereby determining a possible specification) “only if it respects what is 
constitutive of the objects, properties and relations it mentions.”18 Forthwith, 
Peacocke propounds some candidates that could plausibly fit the role of 
Constitutive Principles. One of his examples concerns the fundamental kind of an 
object: 
Fundamental Kind: If P is a property which is an object x’s fundamental kind, 
then an assignment is inadmissible if it counts the proposition x is P as false.19 
Necessity of origin is also discussed as a plausible constitutive principle. But 
what is important to note here is that Peacocke doesn’t attempt to provide an 
exhaustive list of constitutive principles (not even at a highly general level or for 
some significant types of objects, e.g. a list of what should count as constitutive 
principles for all objects, living beings, artefacts, etc.). Nor does Peacocke argue 
that the few principles he does consider are something more than plausible 
variants for Constitutive Principles, to wit, they must be actual implicitly known a 
priori principles shared by an overwhelming majority of the community of 
language users. In fact, he explicitly states that establishing which principles are 
true is not his main concern, but rather emphasising the role of the Principles of 
Possibility in our understanding of modality and developing a general framework 
for further investigation of the domain.20 This important point will be developed 
further on in the paper. 
                                                                                                                                       
16 Peacocke, Being Known, 136. 
17 Peacocke, Being Known, 144. 
18 Peacocke, Being Known, 144. 
19 Peacocke, Being Known, 145. 
20 Cf. Peacocke, Being Known, 191. 
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Finally, there is also a second-order21 plenitude principle, called the 
Principle of Constrained Recombination (PCR): 
PCR: An assignment is admissible if it respects all the previous principles (MEP 
and the Constitutive Principles).22 
PCR states that MEP and the Constitutive Principles are jointly sufficient 
for admissibility. As such, any statement included in a specification that is 
represented by an admissible assignment will be judged as possible. 
The Principles of Possibility determine what counts as possible from a 
metaphysical point of view – whatever is true in an admissible assignment (an 
assignment that respects the principles) is deemed genuinely possible. But they 
also provide an account of our modal knowledge because they are taken to 
constitute the possession conditions for the concept <possible>: if one doesn’t have 
implicit knowledge of the principles, then one doesn’t possess the concept 
<possible>. But when one has the concept, one also has the means to determine if 
some specification is genuinely possible, to wit, one has epistemic access to 
metaphysical modality.23 This guarantees, according to Peacocke, that there is no 
divorce between the metaphysical and the epistemic aspects of modality – they are 
by these means connected, and the Integration Challenge is met. It is important to 
note, in relation to this point, that MEP is recursive, as it applies to the concept 
<admissible> itself (and thereby to the concept <possible>). MEP and the other 
principles make up the rule for <admissible>, therefore determining its actual 
extension. But MEP can be applied to the concept <admissible> itself – if 
something is to count as admissible, it must respect the actual rules for 
<admissible>.24 One important consequence of the self-applicability of MEP is that 
our characterization of necessity will be itself necessary. The gist of the argument 
is pretty straightforward.25 Necessity is defined as truth in all the admissible 
assignments. But this rule of necessity can become an object for MEP – therefore, 
under every admissible assignment s, the semantic value of <necessary> will 
include all and only the thoughts which are true under every admissible 
assignment according to s. But then the characterisation of necessity will be true 
in every admissible assignment, i.e. necessary. This is as it should be if modal truth 
is taken to be mind-independent – if our conception of necessity were contingent, 
and thereby necessary truths were only contingently necessary, then there could 
                                                                
21 A second-order principle is a principle that makes reference to other principles. 
22 Cf. Peacocke, Being Known, 149. 
23 Cf. Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 339. 
24 Cf. Peacocke, Being Known, 151. 
25 Cf. Peacocke, Being Known, 152. 
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be multiple equally entitled characterisations of necessity. This would lead to an 
admission of the possibility of incompatible necessary statements, and thereby to 
the conclusion that a strong notion of metaphysical necessity is untenable. 
Therefore, necessary truths must be necessarily so in any realist account, if that 
account is to succeed. 
3. Wright’s Criticism 
In a paper about Peacocke’s theory of necessity,26 Crispin Wright highlights three 
structural limitations of Peacocke’s principle-based account. I will only dwell 
upon the first structural problem singled out by Wright.27 
Wright’s argument starts from Peacocke’s remark that MEP is recursive, 
which supposedly allows Peacocke to show that his characterisation of necessity is 
itself necessary. Wright points out, rightfully in my opinion, that there is a 
difference between the principles being true under every admissible assignment 
(according to the given account) and something being metaphysically necessary. 
For the account to work, one already has to know that Peacocke’s characterisation 
of necessity is necessarily correct, more precisely, metaphysically necessarily 
correct. Peacocke’s account has to characterise the right type of necessity (true 
metaphysical necessity) and not some other notion (Peacocke-necessity, as Wright 
puts it). For the characterisation of necessity to be necessary according to 
Peacocke, it does not have to be the right one; whatever the Constitutive 
Principles are taken to be, if MEP stays in place, the characterisation will come 
out necessary, i. e. true in all admissible assignments. So, it has to be determined 
independently if the characterisation of necessity is the right one, to wit, that the 
way we construe admissibility by means of Constitutive Principles is correct. 
Wright maintains that this is a symptom of a structural challenge that lies at 
the heart of Peacocke’s account, and is encapsulated in the admission that there is 
a distance between metaphysical necessity and our knowledge of it, viz., that there 
is an Integration Challenge concerning metaphysical modality. “Accepting that 
challenge is accepting that we need to integrate a satisfactory account of the 
constitution of necessity with a satisfactory account of its epistemology,”28 Wright 
argues, but whatever that integrated account is, it will exhibit the same problem. 
According to Peacocke’s account, what one can do is just find a purportedly 
constitutive property, and then attempt to give an account of how we are able to 
                                                                
26 Crispin Wright, “On Knowing What is Necessary: Three Limitations of Peacocke's Account,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2002): 655-662. 
27 Cf. Wright, “On Knowing What is Necessary,” 656-659. 
28 Wright, “On Knowing What is Necessary,” 658. 
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recognise that property. But if the constitutive part is not itself recognised as 
necessary, the account is compromised. Instead of explaining our knowledge of 
necessity, the epistemological part can only provide an account of our knowledge 
of constitutive properties. In light of these remarks, Wright concludes that “[t]he 
success of the account thus depends upon our recognition of a necessity which it 
cannot itself explain.”29 
If Wright’s contentions are correct, the structural problem affects a whole 
class of accounts of modality, not only Peacocke’s theory. Any reductive account 
of modality that proceeds by way of mind-independent constitutive properties 
encounters the problem of justifying its own necessity. In case our 
characterisation of necessity is contingent, we are strongly entitled to doubt 
whether what we recognise as constitutive/essential properties that generate 
necessary truths are indeed so, or this is rather a mind-dependent matter. And this 
brings us to the heart of the matter: the necessity of the account must already be 
acknowledged for it to proceed. But then knowledge of necessity is left 
unexplained. In Peacocke’s case, the recursive character of MEP might be a sign of 
its running-on-any-fuel nature: whatever we ‘pump’ into it, the account still 
works. Even if this is not so, it still shows the inescapable requirement of 
explaining the impetus of the account. How do we recognise that our knowledge 
of the constitutive is the correct one? Peacocke’s answer would be that this is an a 
priori matter – we have an implicit knowledge of constitutive principles. And this 
brings us to the re-statement of an important point: this structural doubt affects 
especially (perhaps exclusively) rationalist theories, that is, specific inquiries that 
proceed from necessary a priori principles of modal knowledge, but at the same 
time maintain that the modal domain is fundamentally mind-independent. The 
principles that ground modal knowledge must themselves be metaphysically 
necessary, but in virtue of what are they so? Even if the possession conditions for 
the concept <necessity> are correctly stated, they cannot provide the metaphysical 
explanation of the necessity of principles. If they could, there wouldn’t be any 
Integration Challenge to consider. But then, if we uphold the necessity of the 
principles by way of constitutive facts, we need an independent integrated 
(metaphysical and epistemological) account of this grounding. What is it that 
makes the principles necessary and how do we know it? Whatever answer we 
concoct, this new characterisation must itself be necessary, so we seem to be left 
with a potentially infinite regress. Potentially infinite because the account can 
                                                                
29 Wright, “On Knowing What is Necessary,” 659. 
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stop at a certain point in its back and forth necessity-essentiality30 movement and 
we may decide that necessity is the primitive notion. For instance, one may 
submit that the Principles of Possibility are just necessary, but we do not (cannot) 
have knowledge of the constitutive facts that ground them. This is not wrong, but 
it is a straightforward admission of defeat for the modal Integration Challenge. 
Are modal rationalist accounts bound to fail because of this structural 
problem? Lowe endorses such an answer, but in relation to all accounts that aim to 
reach mind-independent truth by proceeding from the content of our concepts 
and words: 
[T]he fundamental mistake is to suppose […] that […] an ‘advance’ would have 
to proceed from a basis in our knowledge of our concepts and words – that is, 
from a knowledge of how we conceive of and describe the world – to a 
knowledge of that world ‘as it is in itself,’ independently of our conceptual 
schemes and languages. This ‘inside-out’ account of how knowledge of mind-
independent reality is to be acquired already makes such knowledge impossible 
and must therefore be rejected as incoherent.31 
But before I discuss the impasse of rationalist accounts of a purported mind-
independent modal reality, I will consider a complex criticism of Peacocke’s 
theory by Roca-Royes that I believe to be related to Wright’s argument. 
4. Roca-Royes on Peacocke’s Principle-Based Account 
I will summarise here Roca-Royes’ criticism of Peacocke’s account, insisting on 
what I regard as its most significant aspects.  
Roca-Royes notes that the epistemological problem is not solved simply by 
providing a principle-based account of modality, but rather transferred from the 
modal domain (where it is explicit, according to Roca-Royes) to the constitutive 
domain (the essential properties that are encapsulated in the Constitutive 
Principles, which Peacocke holds that we know implicitly).32 Consequently, the 
task of providing an epistemology of the constitutive is urgent for Peacocke. The 
role of an epistemology of the constitutive would then be to propound a procedure 
by means of which we attain explicit knowledge of (the correct) Constitutive 
                                                                
30 In this context, I take ‘essence’ to be interchangeable with ‘constitutive fact’, viz., whatever 
grounds modal truth without being itself modal. Peacocke’s Constitutive Principles aim to 
reveal precisely such a grounding reality. 
31 E. Jonathan Lowe, “Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism,” 
Philosophia Scientiae 12 (2008): 28. 
32 Cf. Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 340-341. 
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Principles. Peacocke sketches a corresponding solution in a subsequent paper.33 He 
argues that we reach explicit knowledge of the constitutive by using a two-step 
abductive process. At first, we identify some a priori known modal propositions 
(the proposition that if a living being originates in gametes a and b, then it 
necessarily originates in gametes a and b would be an appropriate example of such 
an a priori modal truth) that we use as the abductive base. Then, we search for the 
best explanation for the meaning of necessity that would be in accordance with 
the truth of the a priori modal propositions. The best explanation is, according to 
Peacocke, that necessity conforms to the Principles of Possibility (taking again the 
example given above, necessity would conform to this instance of Essentiality of 
Origin). Roca-Royes argues that the appeal to the a priori known modal 
propositions is ineffective, as all modal knowledge should depend upon the 
Principles of Possibility. When, as in the first step of Peacocke’s abduction, the 
Principles haven’t yet been established, there can be no claim to warranted modal 
knowledge. So, an appeal to independent (regarding the Principles of Possibility) 
route is required.34 
To support the argument, Roca-Royes describes two cases where the 
abductive process would not yield the right kind of explicit constitutive 
knowledge: one where we have only implicit false beliefs about the constitutive 
realm, and the second where it is by mere epistemic luck that the concepts 
constituting our modal knowledge track mind-independent essential truth. In the 
first case, we would arrive at false explicit modal beliefs, and in the second at true 
modal beliefs, but that would not amount to knowledge. To conclude, the account 
is dependent on the correctness of our implicit beliefs about the constitutive 
realm, but even if they are correct, a full-fledged positive account of knowledge of 
the constitutive and how precisely it aligns with mind-independent facts is still 
required. Roca-Royes elaborates on her arguments by noting that we can develop 
accounts for concepts very similar to the purportedly correct one, and they all 
characterize some (potentially interesting) property (e.g., logical possibility, 
conceptual possibility, natural possibility, but also indefinitely many others). This 
raises the question of how we achieve the correct concept among so many 
(slightly or less slightly) deviant ones. The question in its turn emphasizes the fact 
that we need a full-fledged account of our knowledge of the constitutive.35 
                                                                
33 Christopher Peacocke, “The Past, Necessity, Externalism and Entitlement,” Philosophical 
Books 42 (2001): 106-117. 
34 Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 341-342. 
35 Cf. Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 342. 
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Roca-Royes contrasts Peacocke’s set of rules for possibility (MEP + the 
Constitutive Principles) with another account that adds the following rule to 
MEP, instead of the Constitutive Principles: 
(Const) An assignment s is admissible only if, for any entities e1 . . . en (objects, 
properties or relations) and for any n-ary relation R, n ≥ 1, such that entities e1 . . 
. en constitutively stand in the relation R, s does not count Re1 . . . en as false.36 
The alternative account cannot provide a non-conditional characterisation 
of possibility. Roca-Royes uses this difference to note that Peacocke conveniently 
builds just the right amount of content into the modal concepts so that his 
moderate rationalism works (the implicitly known Constitutive Principles cover 
all potential cases). In contrast to this, with the alternative definition one needs an 
independent knowledge of constitutive facts in order to ascertain the possibility of 
something. However, Peacocke’s account is just as ineffective, because the 
Constitutive Principles are not argued for by using an independent 
characterisation.37 Moreover, Roca-Royes suggests that the possession conditions 
for modal concepts are too demanding because they provide a full-fledged theory 
about the constitutive realm, which we supposedly possess implicitly. Modal 
disagreement is a further reason to doubt the appropriateness of Peacocke’s 
account, as is Peacocke’s allowing that there are principles that are unknowable 
explicitly.38 
This concludes my summary of Roca-Royes’ critical examination of 
Peacocke’s moderate rationalism. All is now in place for a reflection on the 
significance of the criticisms explored above. In contrast to Roca-Royes and more 
in line with Wright’s suggestions, I take these difficulties to be a symptom of a 
profound vulnerability of rationalist accounts of modal notions in general, and not 
only of Peacocke’s account. In order to argue for this point, I will attempt to 
radicalize Wright’s and Roca-Royes’ arguments in order to extend them to a wider 
class of philosophical theories. Some supplementary arguments will be formulated. 
This will mark a clear departure from Roca-Royes’ realism and her ultimate 
epistemological optimism concerning metaphysical modality.39  
 
 
                                                                
36 Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 353. 
37 Cf. Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 354-355. 
38 Cf. Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 355-357. 
39 Stated at Roca-Royes, “Modal Epistemology, Modal Concepts,” 336-337. 
Mihai Rusu 
86 
5. The Quandaries of Modal Rationalism 
There are two levels of inquiry of modal rationalist theories that are both plagued 
by problems, as seen in the counterarguments examined above. I will now 
consider the two levels separately and show where Wright’s and Roca-Royes’ 
arguments can be supplemented or radicalized in order to affect a wider class of 
accounts. 
a. The level of content 
The level of content is constituted, naturally, by the specific metaphysical and 
epistemological accounts of real modality. First, we have the problem of: 
a*. The need for a complete account 
The need for a complete list of the a priori principles that determine our modal 
knowledge is inescapable. In the case of Peacocke’s account, this requirement is 
pressing because the content of his Constitutive Principles encodes the possession 
conditions (hence the actual content) of modal concepts. In the absence of a 
complete statement of principles, both the characterisation of our concepts and 
the metaphysical description of mind-independent modal truth are ineffective 
(not only the theory has a spectral object, but it is itself spectral). Actually, this is a 
problem that affects all modal rationalist doctrines that are not fleshed out in an 
exhaustive account. To my knowledge, there is no attempt to provide such a 
complete account to date. Typically, modal rationalist accounts are only sketched, 
as in the cases of Kripke’s and Peacocke’s work. General guidelines are given, and 
suggestions for plausible a priori principles are adduced, but the needed statement 
of principles remains fragmentary and disparate. This way of handling the issue 
may prove a strategic advantage – if less a priori principles are endorsed, the 
chances that the account is disputed are smaller. Theoretically, the correct account 
of the constitutive and the characterisation of our modal knowledge may diverge. 
If, as in Peacocke’s case, the metaphysical explanation of the constitutive realm is 
reflected exactly in our modal concepts, the strategic benefits of not attempting to 
provide the full account of modality are all the more obvious. The problem would 
be not only that the given account of the constitutive realm is wrong, but also that 
the conditions that are imposed on our notions and our knowledge are 
misapprehended. 
These remarks on the need of a complete and accurate integrated account of 
metaphysical modality are not all there is to the story. A problem that is not so 
obvious has to do with the thesis that our (grounding) a priori modal knowledge is 
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implicit. Again, this is not an idea that is to be found exclusively in Peacocke’s 
account. Modal rationalists would want to hold (albeit not always explicitly, one 
may quip) that a priori principles are implicitly known. Remember that in the 
introduction I elaborated on the reasons of developing a modal rationalist account. 
The Integration Challenge is central to rationalist thinking about metaphysical 
modality – rationalists agree that there is a gap between the metaphysical and the 
epistemological aspect of modality. The gap is explained, but also explained away 
by the claim that we have implicit knowledge of the Constitutive Principles – we 
seem to have trouble assembling the two perspectives, because our knowledge is 
not explicit; nevertheless, we can ultimately do it, because our implicit knowledge 
is still knowledge, and can be made explicit with some theoretical effort. But if not 
all our implicit knowledge is made explicit, we cannot pretend to know some 
fundamental facts about our conception of modality. For instance, we don’t even 
know if our conception is consistent. We are entitled to believe that our modal 
knowledge (including our grounding modal knowledge) is vast, so that it can 
cover indefinitely many possible situations. If some of it remains hidden, then 
there is no way of knowing precisely that it doesn’t contain incompatible 
principles. The fact that we have conflicting intuitions about modality in different 
situations makes this worry powerful enough.40 
a**. The ‘just the right amount’ objection 
Roca-Royes takes issue with Peacocke’s building just the right amount of content 
into modal concepts. I hold that this is unavoidable if (any form of) modal 
rationalism is to play an adequate explanatory role. Now, a correct statement of 
the main stance of modal rationalism is that all a posteriori modal knowledge is 
dependent on some a priori modal knowledge. The modal force of a posteriori 
modal knowledge is transferred from the a priori principles. What one wants then 
is that these principles are effective, but also that there is no exception to the rule, 
viz., that there is no a posteriori modal knowledge that is not dependent on a 
priori knowledge. So, for this to happen, our a priori principles have to cover all 
cases of a posteriori modal knowledge. This puts modal rationalism in a very 
uncomfortable epistemological position. If modal truth is mind-independent, one 
may want to hold that there are possibilities that we don’t know of (perhaps even 
cannot know of), for we don’t have knowledge of all that is real and even in the 
cases of things we do know, we sometimes lack knowledge of all that is 
constitutive. The problem that our theory of the possible may be disproved by 
                                                                
40 Theseus’ Paradox would be an example of a case where intuitions rejecting the principle of 
Essentiality of Composition collide with some other intuitions that appear to support it. 
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further discoveries is meaningful, but hardly disconcerting. Its significance lies 
exactly in assisting our understanding of how much in our modal concepts is 
actually thinker-dependent (revising our view of possibility would always proceed 
at first by revising our non-modal concepts). But this is not what should bother us 
here. 
The troublesome aspect of modal epistemology is revealed by accepting that 
the conditions on our possession of concepts are too demanding (as Roca-Royes 
seems to hold). But if these conditions are too demanding, then at least some 
Constitutive Principles don’t do the work that is required of them. This means 
that there are some known modal propositions that are not obtained in the 
rationalist way (by being deduced from a priori principles plus empirical 
information regarding the possession of a certain property). But if there are pieces 
of modal knowledge that are not grounded by any specific a priori principle, then 
why should we think that we need a priori principles for modal knowledge at all? 
It is only natural to suppose that if there is a shorter route to modal knowledge, 
and, moreover, if some of our modal knowledge is not grounded by the a priori, 
then the shorter route is the right one. 
To recap some earlier insights, the need for rationalism presents itself only 
when one acknowledges that there is, in Peacocke’s terms, an Integration 
Challenge concerning metaphysical modality, to wit, we lack an epistemological 
account that explains adequately how we know modal facts. This gap is 
supposedly filled in by a priori principles, but these principles are required to be 
effective and all-encompassing. The gist of modal rationalism is that a priori 
content grounds and explains modal knowledge. But if some modal statements are 
not grounded in our concepts (contrary to what the modal rationalist holds), then 
the rationalist theory lacks actual explanatory power, and the Integration 
Challenge is not met. There still are modal truths that lack a corresponding 
epistemology. The question remains: how do we know these modal truths to be 
necessary/possible? 
There is also a related point that we can make. It is clear that Roca-Royes’ 
minimal principle (Const) is ineffective independently, as it is conditional upon 
previous knowledge or, alternatively, on a sceptical or agnostic stance regarding 
metaphysical modality (and serves all these accounts indiscriminately). But we 
should also notice that such a principle is indispensable in every type of reductive 
account of modality, so every account is, at least minimally, a principle-based 
account. If one believes that essence grounds metaphysical modality (and, 
correspondingly, knowledge of essence/knowledge of constitutive properties 
grounds modal knowledge), then one needs (Const) to link the essential and the 
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modal. However, even though it is plausibly a priori, (Const) is not a grounding 
principle of modality. A posteriori modal knowledge is not dependent on (Const), 
but rather on knowledge of constitutive properties and relations. 
a***. Modal disagreement 
The greatest challenge for modal rationalist accounts is, in my opinion, brought by 
the problem of modal disagreement. Roca-Royes takes modal disagreement to be a 
powerful argument against our modal concepts being as rich in content as 
Peacocke would want it. My point is related, but different. Suppose that two 
philosophers develop two different and incompatible integrated accounts of modal 
knowledge, but in accordance with the general character of rationalist theories 
(that is exhibited in Peacocke’s theory) and without disagreeing on the actual 
empirical facts that are true. For instance, one holds that Essentiality of Origin is a 
universal Principle of Possibility, and one holds that it is not. Now, for Peacocke, 
one of them is making a mistake or is not in possession of the modal concepts. But 
this leads to a dilemma, as there is no principled way to decide who is right. Each 
one may adduce equally powerful independent reasons for her point of view. 
There may be no manifest incoherence in their doctrines. So what can we say 
about this situation? To my mind, the only way to decide between the two, all the 
while respecting the general principles of modal rationalism (mind-independent 
modal truth combined with a priori dependence of our modal knowledge), is to 
find an objective mind-independent criterion that would settle matters. One 
account should lead to correct modal knowledge, and one not. It is, however, very 
difficult to see what such a criterion might be. I cannot find any particular fact 
that would help us decide who is right and who is wrong. The reader should 
remember that the two philosophers may agree on all ordinary non-modal facts, 
but disagree regarding our modal statements, to wit, they disagree on the limits we 
impose on characterising other possible situations. These limits are not given by 
the empirical facts themselves, but by our stance on what counts as constitutive. 
The facts themselves may be mind-independent, but characterising them as 
essential seems to be thinker-dependent. Providing an epistemology of essence, in 
whatever guise, means most of all explaining how it is that some facts impose 
themselves on our knowledge as being essential, and others do not. It is my 
contention that rationalism cannot provide an adequate epistemology of the 
constitutive, and the reason for this has a lot to do with modal disagreement. All 
the empirical facts being acknowledged to be the same, two informed and 
penetrating thinkers may disagree, as they often do, about the principles of 
possibility. Whatever may settle the dispute (if this can happen) could only look 
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like a decision to (re)characterise things in a certain way. If there is no fact of the 
matter about which account is the correct one, then this shows that our take on 
what is to count as essential (or as a principle of possibility) is a mind-dependent 
affair. 
It is very interesting that, from another perspective, modal disagreement 
casts serious doubt on the a priori character of the Principles of Possibility, if we 
take the a priori to be structural. It is implausible that the principles are actually 
being thought of in rationalist accounts as akin to Kripke’s examples of contingent 
a priori truths.41 Even if this were so, they would be deprived of the modal force 
that they are held to imbue modal a posteriori knowledge with. The principles 
also seem to have nothing of the highly abstract and sophisticated character of 
some mathematical notions that sometimes impends us from ascertaining 
mathematical truth. Yet, consensus seems hard to reach regarding the truth of 
modal principles. Could it be then that the principles are just expressions of 
decisions on what ordinary facts are to be held fixed when entertaining 
counterfactual hypotheses? Modal disagreement, supported all the more by the 
lack of any complete principle-based account of modality, points us toward an 
affirmative answer to this question. 
A cumulative conclusion of my discussion so far is that Peacocke doesn’t 
provide us with the much needed solution of discriminating between the correct 
and the deviant accounts of metaphysical modality. I argued that we have serious 
reasons to be pessimistic about the perspectives of formulating a satisfying 
principle-based account. This will become all the more obvious in the following 
discussion of the meta-level of principle-based rationalist accounts. 
b. The meta-level 
I have shown that some of the arguments that can be raised against Peacocke’s 
theory (the most interesting ones, to be sure) are extendable to a whole class of 
accounts, namely, to modal rationalist accounts. If this is correct, then the fault 
must originate not in the misgivings of particular content, but rather in 
metatheoretical aspects that underpin Peacocke’s arguments and theses. The 
explanation of the quandaries of moderate rationalism has therefore less to do 
with Peacocke’s theorising, which is actually quite ingenious, and more to do with 
the epistemology of philosophy, to wit, with the general characteristics of the 
philosophical perspective that is assumed (modal rationalism, in this case). It is 
these structural metatheoretical aspects that lead to certain solutions being 
                                                                
41 The idea of a contingent a priori truth is itself controversial. 
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formulated and employed.42 So, it is not at all mistaken to suggest that what I have 
described in this section as being problematic in relation to the content of theories 
actually has an important metatheoretical component. More precisely, the 
difficulties that are related to the elaboration and development of theoretical 
content are plausibly caused by certain higher-order characteristics. 
The reason that I am discussing the following difficulty under the ‘meta-
level’ heading (when in fact all problems I treated in this chapter are in a 
significant way metatheoretical) is that this one is metatheoretical par excellence. 
The problem arises for an account (e. g., Peacocke’s) in its entirety (it doesn’t 
regard just one specific part of it, as the other problems do) and, if I am right, it is 
a general problem that affects every type of principle-based account (and thereby 
all forms of modal rationalism). 
This second-order difficulty has already been described in an informal 
manner at the end of the section that was focused on Crispin Wright’s criticism. I 
will now restate it in a more argumentative form. But first I will recap how the 
problem is made explicit in Wright’s and Roca-Royes’ criticisms. 
In my opinion, Wright and Roca-Royes both detect the same problem 
regarding Peacocke’s delineation of necessity and describe it in similar terms. 
Wright argues that the recursive character of MEP is useless for grounding the 
necessity of Peacocke’s own characterization of necessity if we don’t already know 
that the account singles out the right kind of modal notion (metaphysical 
necessity) and not some other similar concept. But this is exactly what is in need 
of justification in Peacocke’s account, so no prior grasp of necessity can be 
invoked. Due to its self-applicable nature, Peacocke’s definition of necessity works 
with every noetic fuel – necessary truth will turn out true in every possible 
specification, but this cannot guarantee by itself that we are employing the correct 
notion of necessity. As we have seen, Roca-Royes uses a very similar strategy 
when she disputes Peacocke’s claim that knowledge of the principles is arrived at 
by means of an abduction that proceeds from some modal propositions that are 
known a priori. If modal status is grounded in and inherited from the principles, 
there can be no warranted claim to modal knowledge without the principles being 
already established. Wright also criticizes the overall strategy of explaining the 
modal by means of the constitutive. He claims that this type of account manages at 
best to give an epistemological explanation of the reductive notion, but leaves 
knowledge of necessity unexplained (although the account requires recognition of 
                                                                
42 See Gary Gutting, What Philosophers Know: Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) for more on the epistemology of philosophy and 
the two levels of theory building. 
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necessity to put the theoretical machinery in motion). Now, this last worry can be 
addressed in a fairly satisfying way by using something like Roca-Royes’ (Const) 
principle, viz., something that links (knowledge of) modality with (knowledge of) 
essence in an appropriate way.43 The epistemology of necessity is thereby reduced 
to the epistemology of essence. But all this talk of the need for prior knowledge of 
necessity or about the absence of an adequate modal epistemology may obliterate 
the real character of the predicament of principle-based accounts and their deep 
structural vulnerability. So, let me explain this vulnerability by describing the 
content of the metatheoretical problem in a question-and-answer form. 
The fundamental question is the following: 
Q1: Is our44 characterisation of necessity contingent or necessary? 
A1: The characterisation of necessity is contingent. 
A1 is unacceptable for someone who (like Peacocke and all modal 
rationalists) holds that modal truth is mind-independent. If we allow the 
characterisation of necessity to be contingent, then this can very plausibly be 
linked to the fact that modal truth is fundamentally mind-dependent. The reader 
must note that this is not a claim that the fact that someone arrives at (the correct) 
characterisation of necessity is contingent, in the same way that the fact that we 
developed mathematics is contingent, but mathematical truths are nevertheless 
necessary. A1 encapsulates the thesis that the very definition of necessity (and the 
corresponding principles that it comprises) are contingent, so there may be 
different equally entitled characterisations of purported metaphysical necessity. 
So, the modal rationalist can only endorse: 
A2: The characterisation of necessity is necessary. 
But in order to uphold A2, the modal rationalist cannot appeal to the 
necessity of first-order constitutive principles, as the principles are part of the 
characterisation that needs justification. A recursive principle like MEP will not 
do, as long as the correct real necessity of the account is not established. 
Therefore, the modal rationalist needs a corresponding second-order principle. So, 
now we have: 
Q2: In virtue of what is the characterisation of necessity necessary? 
                                                                
43 It is open for discussion if (Const) manages to do that, but this is not my concern here. I only 
cite (Const) as an example of how an explanatory link between the constitutive and the modal 
should be and can be established. 
44 Where ‘our’ refers to any principle-based characterisation. 
On the Epistemology of Modal Rationalism: The Main Problems and Their Significance 
93 
The proponent of a principle-based account can only give an answer along 
the lines of: 
A3: The characterisation of necessity is necessary in virtue of some constitutive 
fact(s) that is/are encoded in one/several Constitutive Principle(s). 
Then, the problem reappears. The new question is: 
Q3: Is/are this/these Constitutive Principle(s) (and the new corresponding 
definition of necessity) necessary? 
It is quite clear that this way of putting things leads to infinite regress. Yet, 
there is no other way for principle-based accounts (thereby for all typical cases of 
modal rationalism) to proceed as long as there is no prior unproblematic grasp of 
necessity. The problem is that this grasp of necessity is required to be not only 
explicit and unproblematic, but also fundamental – necessity must be taken as 
primitive if we don’t want to set in motion the infinitely regressive necessity – 
essentiality – necessity – … grounding mechanism. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The common thread of the arguments presented here is that they target the main 
aim of modal rationalism: to provide an account that maintains both that modal 
truth is mind-independent and, in Peacocke’s words, ‘fundamentally an a priori 
matter.’ If these arguments are successful, then we have serious reasons to doubt 
that this task can be carried out. The difficulties of Peacocke’s moderate 
rationalism show that when the grounding a priori knowledge is taken to be 
implicit (but how could it be otherwise?), it is very unlikely that we will able to 
characterise our knowledge of metaphysical necessity in an appropriate manner. 
An adequate modal rationalist account cannot remain programmatic, as it is in 
Peacocke’s work – it has to be fully developed if it aims to fulfill an explanatory 
role. Otherwise, it is open to doubt and charges of ineffectiveness. But even if such 
an account is provided, there should be serious concern about its capacity to 
discriminate between correct and deviant modal knowledge. This has to do with 
the peculiar nature of the grounding principles, whatever they are taken to be. It 
is highly doubtful that any principle-based account can garner a large enough 
consensus, but even if this were to happen, the problem also appears at the 
second-order level, where the necessity of the account requires a justification of 
its own. 
A somewhat rushed reply would be that the principles are necessary 
because they are a priori, but anyone that propounds such a solution has missed 
the most important point. “2+2 = 10” is also a statement about a priori entities, but 
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in order to deem it necessarily true or false, one has to know first if it is correct or 
not. This is exactly what we don’t know about the principles and the 
corresponding definitions of modal notions (if we acknowledge that there is an 
Integration Challenge to be met): are they correct or not? However, as I noted in 
the previous paragraph, the Principles themselves have a peculiar nature – they 
don’t seem to be able to acquire the same type of consensus that mathematical 
truths acquire among competent users of mathematics. Now, this raises a very 
interesting question that is, in my opinion, a fertile challenge for further research. 
Are the principles of possibility, whatever they are taken to be, a priori and if this 
is so, what type of a priori knowledge are we talking about? Thinking again about 
mathematical knowledge, could it be that we operate with modal notions in a 
similar way, that is, could they project/make explicit certain rules for concept use 
or certain properties of our concepts?45 Would modal competence then be a 
conceptual competence of sorts? The individualised and highly controversial 
character of some of our modal evaluations raises some concerns about this point 
of view, but perhaps this concern can be allayed with accepting the fact that 
different users employ different rules for what appear to be the same concepts. Or, 
better, modal disagreement may be a consequence of the fact that rules for 
concept use are not as strict and rigorous as mathematical rules. Naturally, in the 
case this theoretical option is pursued, it should mark a clear departure from a 
modal rationalist position; the guideline for assessing the truth of a statement like 
‘if X is a cat, then X is necessarily an animal’ would not be that it correctly tracks 
some mind-independent truth, but rather that it correctly specifies the limits of 
use of the concept <cat>. Another option would be to hold that the principles are 
in fact forms of a posteriori knowledge, perhaps of a more peculiar kind.46 This is 
also (and more clearly so) incompatible with a rationalist perspective. 
McLeod has argued that ontological realism about modality requires modal 
rationalism.47 If this is correct and the problems discussed in this paper truly affect 
all forms of modal rationalism, then these difficulties are really even more 
worrying than argued here. I don’t wish to pursue this line of reasoning in this 
paper, but if my inquiry is significant, one thing it clearly suggests is that robust 
realism about metaphysical modality should be disputed more vigorously in the 
ongoing epistemological debate regarding modal notions. 
                                                                
45 A view along these lines is developed by Amie Thomasson in “Modal Normativism and the 
Methods of Metaphysics,” Philosophical Topics 35 (2007): 135-160 and “Norms and Necessity,” 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2013): 143-160. 
46 See Elder, “An Epistemological Defence of Realism,” for a way to argue in favour of this claim. 
47 Cf. McLeod, “Rationalism and Modal Knowledge.” 
